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WITTGENSTEIN, ANSCOMBE, AND WHAT 
CAN ONLY BE TRUE 
Cora Diamond  
Charlottesville, VA, USA 
My talk concerns something that Anscombe took to be one 
of the main flaws in the Tractatus, that it excludes proposi-
tions that can only be true, apart from tautologies and 
mathematical propositions.  My talk is an investigation of 
what the distance is, exactly, between Wittgenstein and 
Anscombe on this issue, taking into account Wittgenstein's 
early views and their later development. 
 
MISLEADING PARALLELS. WITTGENSTEIN, 
ANALOGY, AND PHILOSOPHICAL 
PROBLEMS 
Alexandra Dias Fortes 
Lisbon, Portugal  
According to Wittgenstein, there are misunderstandings 
that emerge due to certain analogies in the forms of our 
language. Misleading parallels that are not recognized as 
such, are felt as problems by philosophers who are predis-
posed not to look at the actual use of our words. 
Although “expressions constructed on analogical patterns” 
play an important role in human thought, they might also 
produce false appearances. In the hope of seeing how to 
overcome the confusions thus originated, I propose a brief 
overview of some of Wittgenstein’s remarks that deal with 
this complex facet of analogies, similes, and a certain 
tendency for symmetry, characteristic of philosophical 
investigation when explanations are sought after that serve 
as a counterpart to what is open to view in our language 
games (for instance, the inclination to see the inner as 
what can complement the outer in a symmetric composi-
tion). 
 
THE FRAMEWORK OF PERCEPTION 
Jérôme Dokic 
Paris, France 
On a traditional epistemological picture, there can be only 
two kinds of explanations of the falsity of an ordinary per-
ceptual judgment. The first kind of explanation is that the 
underlying perceptual experience itself is illusory and the 
subject has been misled in accepting its content as true. 
The second kind of explanation locates the problem at the 
level of erroneous background beliefs involved in the 
formation of the subject’s judgment as further premises 
themselves in need of justification. The problem with the 
traditional picture is that the dichotomy between perceptual 
illusions and cognitive errors is not exhaustive. Ordinary 
perceptual knowledge also rests on “hinge propositions” 
(Wittgenstein 1969) or “primitive certainties” (Mulligan 
2006), namely propositions that are taken for granted or 
presupposed in the formation of the perceptual judgement 
without being independently justified by background be-
liefs. Some of these propositions might be false without 
there being perceptual illusions or cognitive errors properly 
speaking. In this talk, I enquire into the nature of hinge 
propositions involved in ordinary perceptual knowledge, 
and suggest that the framework of perception is best 
thought in the context of an austere (vs liberal) theory of 
perceptual content. 
 
„TENNIS OHNE BALL“: WITTGENSTEINS 
ARGUMENTATION GEGEN BEHAVIORISMUS 
UND MENTALISMUS 
Tomáš Došek 
Olomouc, Tschechische Republik  
Der Artikel beschäftigt sich mit Wittgensteins Bezug zu 
Behaviorismus auf der Basis der Zurückweisung einer 
privaten Sprache. Seine Kritik an Mentalismus im Kontext 
von Privatsprachenproblem zeigt starke behavioristische 
Züge. Ich werde dafür argumentieren, dass dies jedoch 
nicht als eine hinreichende Bedingung für behavioristische 
Deutung von Wittgensteins Spätdenken gelesen werden 
kann. Mehr noch, ich möchte zeigen, dass Wittgensteins 
Position zu Behaviorismus dieselben argumentativen Züge 
aufweist, wie Kritik an Mentalismus und Introspektion. Als 
Schilderung von Wittgensteins Argumentation gegen 
Behaviorismus wird das Gedankenexperiment „Tennis 
ohne Ball“ interpretiert. Das Experiment wendet sich zwar 
primär gegen die Auffassung vom „inneren Sprechen“, ich 
werde jedoch zeigen, dass es ebenso plausibel für die 
Argumentation gegen Behaviorismus gedeutet werden 
kann. An diesem Beispiel möchte ich die Gemeinsamkeiten 
der Kritik an Mentalismus und Behaviorismus beleuchten. 
 
MEANINGLESS BELIEFS IN WITTGENSTEIN'S  
"PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOLOGY – A 
FRAGMENT" 
Matthew R. Dougherty 
Blacksburg, VA, USA  
In Section iv of his “Philosophy of Psychology—A Frag-
ment” Wittgenstein seems to tell us that we do not believe 
that people have souls. This paper considers how we 
should understand his claim. It does so by applying the 
idea from throughout the Investigations that meaning is 
use. The conclusion reached is that Wittgenstein should be 
understood as claiming that statements of belief about the 
soul will only make sense in particular contexts, the lesson 
of which is that beliefs in general are not guaranteed to be 
ascribable across contexts and, so, do not fit our standard 
picture of them. 
 
THE FACE-VALUE THEORY AND THE 
CONTENT OF PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES 
Dušan Dožudić 
Zagreb, Croatia 
Propositional attitudes are commonly treated as relations 
between agents and propositions and propositional attitude 
reports as stating precisely such relations. This is the basis 
of what Schiffer calls ‘the face-value theory’ of proposi-
tional attitude reports. A number of philosophers argued 
that such theory, as it stands, is untenable, or plainly false. 
Accordingly, they proposed various moderate or radical 
departures from it. In what follows I will discuss two such 
moderate departure, and argue that they do not avoid the 
very problem that their proponents took as the initial rea-
son for departing from the face-value theory. 
 
TWO TYPES OF BIOSEMANTIC 
REPRESENTATION 
Christian Ebeling 
Hamburg, Germany   
Biosemantics as proposed by Ruth Millikan is explaining 
mental representations and meaning in the context of their 
evolutionary function. While the teleosemantic account 
